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I. INTRODUCTION  
New Zealand is one of the world’s oldest 
and most stable liberal democracies. It has 
held regular triennial elections to its national 
Parliament since 1855, resulting in repeated 
peaceful transfers of power between gov-
ernments. Such elections have special sig-
nificance in New Zealand’s constitutional 
arrangements due to the nation’s lack of any 
written constitution and ongoing commit-
ment to parliamentary sovereignty. Because 
Parliament may in theory enact any legisla-
tion it wishes and the courts have no consti-
tutional power to invalidate such enactments, 
the electorate’s regular selection or rejection 
of aspiring members of Parliament (MPs) 
remains the critical constraint on lawmaking 
power. New Zealand therefore retains a form 
of liberal democracy in which popular polit-
ical control exercised through the electoral 
process generally is preferred to judicially 
policed constraints on legislative power.
Within this constitutional framework, a gen-
eral parliamentary election in September 
2017 saw the previously governing Nation-
al Party replaced by a three-way govern-
ing coalition consisting of the Labour, NZ 
First and Green Parties. This change was 
enabled by the operation of New Zealand’s 
Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) voting 
system. Despite the National Party retaining 
a substantial plurality of the vote, the La-
bour, NZ First and Green Parties’ combined 
support provided them with the overall par-
liamentary majority necessary to govern. 
Consequently, the new governing coalition 
does not contain the largest political party in 
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3 Electoral Act 1893.
the Parliament, but instead brings together 
three smaller parties. This arrangement is a 
somewhat novel development for New Zea-
land, requiring adjustment to government 
processes. However, it delivers on MMP’s 
original promise – that parties would be pre-
pared to compromise their policy positions 
during negotiations to enable majority agree-
ment on who will run the country.
II. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY ON 
THE RISE OR DECLINE?
New Zealand’s constitutional commitment 
to liberal democracy is long standing and 
deeply held. Elections to a national Parlia-
ment first were held only 15 years after the 
country became a British colony and gener-
ally have been accepted as free and fair in 
practice. Although voting originally was re-
stricted to property-owning males, the fran-
chise progressively was extended to cover 
all Maori men in 1867,1  all other men in 
18792  and all women in 1893.3  A system 
of guaranteed parliamentary representation 
IRU0ƗRULDOVRKDVH[LVWHGVLQFH0RUH
recently, in the early 1990s the country de-
cided by referendum to move from a first-
past-the-post electoral system to the strongly 
proportional MMP method of voting. This 
reform took place only a few years after the 
rejection of a proposal to replace the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty with a higher 
law written constitution permitting judicial 
enforcement of individual rights guarantees. 
 
Given this history, it is difficult to see how 
representative democracy could become 
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even more embedded in New Zealand’s con-
stitutional culture.4  However, the country 
has not experienced the sorts of dramatic 
challenges to liberal democratic principles 
or practices recently observed elsewhere. 
While electoral participation has fallen from 
its mid-twentieth century heights, 79.1% of 
enrolled voters still cast a ballot at the 2017 
general election (representing a 2.3% in-
crease on the previous election). Parliament 
as an institution continues to command sig-
nificant respect amongst the general popu-
lace: 39% of New Zealanders have “high” or 
“very high” trust in it, while 29% have “low” 
trust.5  None of the parties contesting the 
2017 election could be described as extrem-
ist or anti-democratic in nature, despite New 
Zealand imposing minimal legal restrictions 
on the types of parties that can form or the 
policies they may espouse. There is thus 
little evidence of a general loss of faith in 
liberal democracy as a means of collective 
governance for New Zealand. 
2017 instead involved some minor reor-
dering of New Zealand’s version of liber-
al democracy along two vectors. First, the 
general election outcome resulted in a novel 
inter-party arrangement that reordered both 
governing practices and the electorate’s 
expectations. This development marks the 
MMP era’s coming of age, as three smaller 
parties with somewhat disparate policy pro-
grammes were able to negotiate to form a 
government that excluded Parliament’s larg-
est political party. Second, a decision of New 
Zealand’s full Court of Appeal directly con-
sidered Parliament’s legislative treatment of 
prisoners’ right to vote and formally declared 
it to be inconsistent with the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA). While 
this declaration could not affect the ongoing 
validity of the relevant enactment, it raises 
questions about the future relationship be-
tween the legislature and the judiciary on 
matters of individual rights. Each of these 
matters is considered in turn.
 
Under New Zealand’s Westminster system, 
MPs from the largest party in Parliament 
4 See Matthew Palmer, ‘New Zealand Constitutional Culture’ (2007) 22 NZ U L Rev 565, 580-82.
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have governed the country since party gov-
ernment first developed in the late nineteenth 
century. When the country’s original first-
past-the-post voting system was in opera-
tion, this largest party virtually always com-
manded a parliamentary majority in its own 
right. Since MMP’s introduction in 1996, 
the largest party still was able to attract the 
necessary support from other parliamentary 
parties to govern in some form of multi-party 
arrangement. It appeared likely this tradition 
would continue following the 2017 election, 
as the governing National Party won 44.4% 
of the party votes (which ultimately deter-
mine the overall share of parliamentary seats 
under MMP). However, following a month-
long period of post-election negotiations, the 
NZ First Party (with 7%) instead agreed to 
form a coalition arrangement with the La-
bour Party (with 37%), supported by the 
Green Party (with 6%). 
 
This outcome is constitutionally significant 
for two reasons. First, it disproved assertions 
regarding a general public expectation that 
the largest party should have some role in 
the country’s government. Any such expec-
tation did not reflect formal constitutional 
convention, which simply requires that a 
government have majority support in Par-
liament without saying how that must be 
achieved. Instead, it was claimed to manifest 
a mixture of assumption (“this is just what 
always has happened before”) and general 
notions of fairness (“the most popular ought 
to get to run things”). The new governing 
arrangement thus demonstrates an evolution 
in voters’ views as to what form of govern-
ment is legitimate, with the public generally 
accepting that a combination of smaller par-
ties able to command a parliamentary major-
ity can govern over the top of a larger par-
ty. Such acceptance reveals that, after eight 
elections under the MMP voting system, the 
public has grown comfortable with the idea 
that multi-party compromises on policy mat-
ters are a necessary and legitimate part of the 
government formation process.
Second, the new governing arrangement in-
volves a subtly different structure to previ-
ous MMP-era governments. The preferred 
model has been for one of the major parties 
(National or Labour) to form a minority 
government on its own while entering into 
so-called “enhanced confidence and supply 
agreements” with a range of other support 
parties. These enhanced agreements involve 
the support parties putting their votes behind 
the governing party (or parties) on key mat-
ters of confidence and supply, thereby pro-
viding the parliamentary majority needed for 
the government to enter and remain in of-
fice. They also commit to supporting central 
parts of that government’s legislative agenda 
while the governing party in turn agrees to 
advance some of the support parties’ poli-
cies. However, MPs from the support parties 
do not formally join the government, do not 
sit in cabinet, and retain the right to oppose 
and criticise the government on any policy 
issues that they have not expressly commit-
ted to support. Further complicating matters, 
the leader or leaders of the support parties 
also receive a ministerial role, thereby gain-
ing some control over executive government 
decision making in a particular policy field 
and the enhanced public profile that ministe-
rial office confers. 
Following the 2017 election, however, the 
Labour and NZ First Parties chose to enter 
into a formal governing coalition, with min-
isters from each party sitting together in cab-
inet. The Green Party then entered into an 
enhanced confidence and supply agreement 
with this coalition, being granted some min-
isterial roles in return. Therefore, in formal 
constitutional terms, the Labour-NZ first 
government is a minority one, able to hold 
office with the Green Party’s guaranteed 
support. In practical terms, however, the 
three parties must manage their respective 
ministerial portfolios collectively, meaning 
that the Green Party is a functional part of 
the governing arrangements. Each party’s 
different formal role is thus more a matter of 
political positioning; NZ First in particular 
wishes to be viewed as the dominant partner 
in government with Labour, and also wants 
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to be able to deny it is “in government” with 
the Greens (with which it has significant 
ideological differences). 
2017’s other major constitutional develop-
ment regarding New Zealand’s liberal dem-
ocratic processes was the Court of Appeal’s 
decision in Attorney General v Taylor.6  This 
case involved the issuance of a declaration 
of inconsistency under the NZBORA in re-
lation to legislation that removed the right 
to vote from all sentenced prisoners. It was 
significant for two reasons. First, the Court’s 
unanimous judgment from a full bench of 
five judges delved deeply into the constitu-
tional relationship between the judicial and 
legislative branches of New Zealand’s gov-
ernment. Second, the Court’s decision to 
uphold the grant of a declaration of incon-
sistency focuses attention on the respective 
roles of each institution when it comes to 
defining and protecting individual rights.
The NZBORA guarantees a range of civil 
and political rights, including the right to 
vote,7  against “unjustified limits” by the 
state.8  However, in a deliberate affirmation 
of parliamentary sovereignty, it also prohib-
its courts from invalidating or refusing to ap-
ply any other parliamentary enactment that 
imposes an unjustified rights limit.9  It then 
remained unclear whether in such cases the 
courts still could issue a formal declaration 
that an inconsistency exists between the NZ-
BORA and the other enactment. While such 
a declaration could not affect the other en-
actment’s ongoing application as valid law, 
it might nevertheless serve to encourage the 
6  [2017] NZCA 215, [2017] 3 NZLR 24.
7 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 12(a).
8 Ibid., s 5.
9 Ibid., s 4.
10 Taylor v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1706, [2015] 3 NZLR 791.
11 Attorney-General v Taylor [2017] NZCA 215, [2017] 3 NZLR 24 at [43].
12 Ibid., at [44].
13 Ibid., at [55].
14 Philip A Joseph, ‘Parliament, the Courts and the Collaborative Enterprise’ (2004) 15 KCLJ 321.
15 Attorney-General v Taylor [2017] NZCA 215, [2017] 3 NZLR 24 at [62].
16 Ibid., at [149]-[150].
17 Ibid., at [151].
18 Tom Hickman, ‘Bill of Rights Reform and the Case for Going Beyond the Declaration of Incompatibility Model’ [2015] NZ L Rev 35; Claudia Geiringer, 
º0UH\N\YHS3LJ[\YL!4Y)\S^HYRHUK[OL7YV[LJ[PVUVM/\THU9PNO[Z»BD=<>39L]".LɈYL`7HSTLY(UKYL^)\[SLYA Constitution for Aotearoa 
legislative branch to revisit and amend it.
 
The matter came to a head through the action 
of a convicted prisoner, Mr Taylor, who chal-
lenged a 2010 statute that removed the right 
to enroll to vote from all sentenced prisoners 
whilst imprisoned. Remarkably, the Crown 
conceded that this measure imposes an un-
justified limit on the NZBORA guaranteed 
right to vote. Nevertheless, it argued that 
the courts had no remedial role to play as 
the statutory prohibition on enrollment was 
clear and so must be applied, while the NZ-
BORA contains no specific declaration-mak-
ing power. At first instance, the High Court 
disagreed and granted a declaration to mark 
the voting ban’s rights-inconsistent nature.10 
The Crown appealed on the ground that the 
High Court was wrong to find any jurisdic-
tion to grant that remedy.
The Court of Appeal thus had to decide 
whether, in the absence of any specific au-
thorisation in the NZBORA, a court had the 
power to grant a formal judicial declaration 
of inconsistency. In doing so it “rehearse[d] 
some elementary principles about the rela-
tionship between the political and judicial 
branches of government and the role of the 
higher courts under New Zealand’s constitu-
tion.”11  While continuing to recognise that 
Parliament enjoys sovereign law-making 
status in terms of “mak[ing] or unmak[ing] 
any law it wishes, unconstrained by any 
entrenched or codified constitution,”12  the 
Court also emphasised the judiciary’s inde-
pendent role in declaring the law (includ-
ing whether legislation is “enacted law” to 
which obedience is due).13  Adopting Philip 
Joseph’s phrase, the Court described its role 
in this “collaborative enterprise”14  of gov-
ernance as “extend[ing] to answering ques-
tions of law, and as a general proposition 
[this] does not require express legislative 
authority. Inconsistency between statutes is 
a question of interpretation, and hence of 
law, and it lies within the province of the 
courts.”15 
After finding that a formal declaration of in-
consistency is an available judicial remedy, 
the Court upheld the High Court’s decision 
to grant one. In doing so, the Court expressly 
cast its actions in terms of fostering a “dia-
logue” with the political branches of govern-
ment over the appropriate limits that should 
apply to individual rights.16  A declaration of 
inconsistency, in the Court’s view, carries 
with it “the reasonable expectation that other 
branches of government, respecting the ju-
dicial function, will respond by reappraising 
the legislation and making any changes that 
are thought appropriate.”17  This invocation 
of “constitutional dialogue” then opens up 
the issue of the proper role for the judicial 
and legislative branches of government in 
relation to defining and protecting individu-
al rights in a liberal democracy. Historically, 
this has been very much the province of New 
Zealand’s Parliament, with rights issues 
treated as simply another matter of policy for 
popularly elected representatives to resolve. 
However, recently there have been calls for 
greater judicial involvement in considering 
such matters.18  Those calls reflect concerns 
that MPs may fail to properly understand the 
202 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
rights implications of legislation they con-
sider and vote on as well as fears that they 
will systemically undervalue the rights of 
particularly unpopular social groups. Sim-
ply put, the elected lawmaking institution 
in New Zealand’s liberal democratic consti-
tutional framework may not be fully trust-
worthy when it comes to deciding how the 
rights of individuals should be understood.
The ultimate impact of the Court of Appeal’s 
declaration is yet to be seen. The Crown has 
been granted leave to appeal the decision to 
the New Zealand Supreme Court,19  although 
the strength and unanimous nature of the full 
Court of Appeal’s decision make it unlikely 
to succeed. The previous National Govern-
ment, which had enacted the ban on prisoner 
voting, showed no interest in revisiting the 
matter in the wake of the Court’s declaration 
while it received scant attention in a parlia-
mentary report on the 2014 general elec-
tion.20  However, the new Labour-NZ First-
Green Government may be more receptive 
to the judicial message that a complete ban 
on prisoner voting represents an unjustifi-
able limit on the right to vote: two of these 
parties voted against the legislation when 
first enacted.
New Zealand (VUW Press, 2016).
19 Attorney General v Taylor [2017] NZSC 131.
20 Justice and Electoral Committee, ‘Inquiry Into the 2014 General Election’ (2016) AJHR I.7A 28.
21 Te Urewera Act 2014, s 11.
22 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, s 14.
23 Ibid., ss 18-19.
24 James D K Morris and Jacinta Ruru, ‘Giving Voice to Rivers: Legal Personality as a Vehicle for Recognising Indigenous Peoples’ Relationships to Water?’ 
(2010) 14 AILR 49.
25 Ibid., at p 58. 
26 Ibid., at p 57.
27;L(UNH7Ȼ[HRLYVUNVTȬ5NȊ4H\UNHV;HYHUHRP7V\HRȊPTL2HP[HRL9LJVYKVM<UKLYZ[HUKPUNMVY4V\U[;HYHUHRP7V\HRHPHUK[OL2HP[HRL9HUNLZ»
(20 December 2017) <https://www.govt.nz/dmsdocument/7265.pdf> accessed 30 January 2018.
28 See, for example, Eleanor Ange Roy, ‘New Zealand river granted same legal rights as human being’ The Guardian (16 March 2017) <https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/16/new-zealand-river-granted-same-legal-rights-as-human-being> accessed 30 January 2018; Bryan Rousseau, ‘In New 
Zealand, Lands and Rivers Can Be People (Legally Speaking)’ The New York Times (13 July 2016) <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/world/what-in-
the-world/in-new-zealand-lands-and-rivers-can-be-people-legally-speaking.html> accessed 30 January 2018.
29:PTVU+H ̀º0M[OLOPSSZJV\SKZ\L!1HJPU[H9\Y\VUSLNHSWLYZVUHSP[`HUKH4ȊVYP^VYSK]PL^»;OL:WPUVɈ5V]LTILY#O[[WZ![OLZWPUVɈJVUa
atea/atea-otago/27-11-2017/if-the-hills-could-sue-jacinta-ruru-on-legal-personality-and-a-maori-worldview/> accessed 30 January 2018.
30 [2017] NZSC 17, [2017] 1 NZLR 423.
III. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Two further constitutional developments – 
ERWKUHODWLQJWR0ƗRULEXWLQYROYLQJYHU\GLI-
ferent issues – are worthy of note. The first is 
the continuance of a trend that sees the giv-
ing legal personhood to a natural geographic 
and/or environmental feature as part of re-
GUHVVIURP&URZQWR0ƗRULIRUWKHIRUPHU¶V
historical breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi.
New Zealand blazed this trail in 2014 when, 
DVSDUWRIWKHVHWWOHPHQWZLWKWKH7ǌKRHLZL
(tribe) for its historical breaches of the Trea-
ty of Waitangi, the Crown recognised the 
former Te Uruwera national park as being 
a legal entity with “all the rights, powers, 
duties, and liabilities of a legal person.”21 
The 2017 settlement between the Crown and 
Whanganui iwi went a step further: legisla-
tion declared the Whanganui River and its 
tributaries (collectively known as Te Awa 
Tupua) to be a legal person with “all the 
rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a le-
gal person.”22  The legislation then establish-
es a new office – Te Pou Tupua – to act and 
speak for and on behalf of Te Awa Tupua.23 
It comprises two people, one nominated by 
iwi and one by the Crown. 
Such a development was proposed seven 
years ago by Morris and Ruru as an alterna-
tive model to simple legislative recognition 
of the importance of a river to local iwi.24 
They described the advantage of legal per-
sonhood as “tak[ing] a western legal prece-
dent and giv[ing] life to a river that better 
DOLJQVZLWK D0ƗRULZRUOGYLHZ WKDWKDV DO-
ways regarded rivers as containing their own 
distinct life forces,”25  thereby putting the 
health and well-being of the river at the fore-
front of decision-making.26  Furthermore, the 
trend is set to continue, with the Crown and 
Taranaki iwi in December signing “Te Anga 
3ǌWDNHURQJR´ ± D UHFRUG RI XQGHUVWDQGLQJ
– that Mount Taranaki will also soon gain 
recognition as a legal, living entity.27  These 
developments are not only constitutional-
ly significant for New Zealand but gained 
international attention28  as a “disruptive 
XQLRQ´ RI D:HVWHUQ FRQFHSWZLWK D0ƗRUL
worldview.29
The second major constitutional develop-
ment was the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Proprietors of Wakatu v Attorney-General.30 
A 4:1 majority held the Crown could owe a 
fiduciary duty to the collective descendants 
of the original customary title-holders to 
land, and in doing so struck “a very differ-
HQW SDWKZD\ IRU GHDOLQJZLWK0ƗRUL FODLPV
of historical land loss than the systematised 
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and politically negotiated settlements that 
have predominated since the mid-1990s.”31 
That shift in approach made it “one of the 
most important decisions from a New Zea-
land court in the last 25 years.”32
The case was based on the nineteenth cen-
tury New Zealand Company’s approach to 
SXUFKDVLQJ ODQG IURP 0ƗRUL DV SDUW RI LWV
colonisation scheme. That approach saw a 
tenth of the land being purchased set aside 
IRU0ƗRULLQDGGLWLRQWRDQ\H[LVWLQJODQGRF-
FXSLHGE\0ƗRULZKLFKZDVH[HPSWHGIURP
the sale. In 1839 the New Zealand Company 
purchased 151,000 acres of land in the upper 
South Island from three iwi, meaning 15,100 
DFUHVVKRXOGKDYHEHHQUHVHUYHGIRU0ƗRUL
After the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi 
EHWZHHQ WKH&URZQDQG0ƗRUL LQ)HEUXDU\
1840, the Crown alone assumed the power to 
SXUFKDVHODQGIURP0ƗRULDQGDOOSUH
sales were reviewed to ensure they were eq-
uitable. The sale in question was reviewed 
and confirmed in 1845 with the land first 
vesting in the Crown. The Crown would then 
grant the land to the New Zealand Company 
on the condition that the 15,100 acres were 
reserved and held on trust and no areas occu-
SLHGE\0ƗRULZHUHSDUWRIWKHVDOH
However, the Crown failed to ensure these 
conditions were met: only 5,100 acres were 
reserved and the sale included areas oc-
FXSLHG E\ 0ƗRUL 7KRVH  DFUHV ZHUH
further diminished, so that by the time they 
were released to the descendants of the orig-
inal landowners in 1977, only 1,626 acres 
remained. The claim before the Court was 
that the Crown held a fiduciary duty to the 
landowners (and their descendants) to en-
sure the conditions of the original sale were 
fulfilled and breached that duty by failing to 
do so. At both the High Court and Court of 
Appeal, the Crown successfully resisted the 
plaintiffs’ – the descendants of the original 
landowners – claim on the basis that as it 
31 Carwyn Jones, ‘Analysis: 7YVWYPL[VYZVM>HRH[ȻHUK6[OLYZ]([[VYUL`.LULYHS[2017] NZSC 17’ Blog of the IACL, AIDC (13 May 2017) <https://iacl-aidc-
blog.org/2017/05/13/analysis-proprietors-of-wakatu-and-others-v-attorney-general-2017-nzsc-17/> accessed 30 January 2018.
32  Ibid. 
33 Guerin v The Queen [1984] 2 SCR 335, 13 DLR (4th) 321 (SCC).
34 Proprietors of Wakatu v Attorney-General [2017] NZSC 17, [2017] 1 NZLR 423 at [726].
35 See Ngaronoa v Attorney General [2017] NZCA 351, [2017] 3 NZLR 643.
36 Andrew Geddis, ‘Judicial Enforcement of New Zealand’s Reserved Provisions’ (2017) 28 Pub L Rev 277.
acted in a governmental capacity, it did not 
(and could not) incur fiduciary duties. The 
Supreme Court overturned those decisions 
and held that the Crown owed fiduciary du-
ties to reserve 15,100 acres for the benefit of 
the landowners.
This was a significant departure from the or-
thodox approach of categorising the Crown’s 
actions as a breach of Treaty of Waitangi ob-
ligations and thus a public rather than private 
law matter. To this extent, it is worth noting 
that both O’Regan and Arnold JJ held that 
WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ&URZQ DQG0ƗRUL
landowners was not necessarily a “true” or 
“pure” trust relationship. They instead adopt-
ed the Canadian precedent of Guerin v The 
Queen,33  holding that the Crown’s breach of 
a fiduciary duty would have the same effect 
as if a trust relationship existed.34 Regard-
less, however, the obstacles surmounted by 
the plaintiffs – issues of standing and lim-
itations to name but a few – made the result 
remarkable. Although the Court remitted to 
the High Court the final determination of 
the extent of the breach of the fiduciary duty 
and the remedies owed (if any), the decision 
KDVVLJQLILFDQWFRQVHTXHQFHV:KLOH0ƗRUL
Crown relationships continue to be funda-
mentally constitutional in nature, the nature 
of that relationship will inevitably be altered 
by the recognition of the kinds of ongoing 
private law duties found to exist in :DNDWǌ.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD TO 2018
The issue of prisoner voting will continue to 
resonate in 2018. Not only will the Supreme 
Court decide whether to uphold the Court of 
Appeal’s declaration of inconsistency but it 
also will hear an appeal that claims the leg-
islation was not enacted consistently with a 
provision in the Electoral Act 1993 requiring 
a 75% majority vote to alter certain aspects 
of the country’s voting rules.35 Should the 
Court decide the prisoner voting ban was not 
so enacted then it may declare the legislation 
invalid.36  There also is the matter of whether 
the government will revisit the issue in light 
of the judiciary’s clear message about the ex-
isting law’s rights implications. In addition, 
VWDOOHG0ƗRUL&URZQQHJRWLDWLRQVRYHUULJKWV
to fresh water may see the Supreme Court 
asked to rule on whether customary rights of 
ownership of that resource still exist.
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